that pretrial detainees were subject only to those restrictions which were a natural product of confinement or were necessary to ensure the presence of the detainees at in the period since Wolfish to determine whether judicial relief remains available in the federal system for prisoners' claims. To do so, it will be necessary first to explore the evolution of judicial intervention in correctional reform during the 1970s and the relationship of Wolfish to earlier Supreme Court decisions influential in defining the scope ofjudicial intervention in prison administration.
II. BACKGROUND
Until the past ten to fifteen years, a majority of state and federal courts followed a policy of declining jurisdiction over most litigation involving prisons. This policy, now generally referred to as the "hands-off" doctrine, 10 originally reflected the view that a convicted prisoner was a "slave of the State,"" without enforceable rights. Despite the eventual rejection of the slave theory, courts continued to apply the hands-off doctrine strictly, absent exceptional circumstances raising questions of cruel and unusual punishment. 12 Even when exceptional circumstances existed, the courts often invoked the doctrine. As a practical matter, then, prisoners had no judicial forum for relief."
executive branch of government, including wide discretion over routine prison matters.' 8 In viewing the prison as an administrative agency, courts applied the traditional "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review,' 9 which gave much protection-in fact, conferred a presumption of validity-to the officials' discretionary powers. 20 This theory has been subject to criticism for treating prisons far more deferentially than other administrative agencies, 2 ' for circular reasoning, 2 2
for incorrectly imputing to legislatures the intent to protect correctional discretion from review,2 and for abandoning judicial responsibility for ensuring achievement of the goals underlying court imposed sentences.H Two commentators have argued that courts act not in conflict with affirmative legislative and executive programs but because of the vacuum created by legislative and executive inaction or neglect.25 Federal courts also frequently cited principles of federalism as the basis for refusing to review prisoners' claims on the merits. 26 Yet in other kinds of institutional litigation, federal courts have shown proper respect for state considerations, without refusing jurisdiction, by maintaining a deliberate pace of litigation, seeking substantial guidance from state officials, and coordinating enforcement of decrees with the state defendants.
Concomitant with the separation of powers doctrine was the courts' acknowledgement of their lack of expertise to administer prison affairs. 28 Critics have considered this to be one of the weakest arguments, for courts have interfered with the operation of other institutions previously thought beyond judicial expertise.2 Finally, courts predicted that anything less than a total hands-off approach would undermine the prisons' disciplinary systems, 3 0 and foresaw prisoners intentionally violating rules to defy the guards, courts invalidating essential means for controlling prisoners, and guards hesitating to act decisively because of confusion over what practices would be judicially acceptable.
3 ' This argument waned simply because of its indiscriminate use by courts in cases in which the challenged practice bore only an attenuated relationship to this subversion of discipline rationale.
3 2 In addition, judicial intervention has been seen as a means of relieving tensions created by excessive or arbitrary conditions and practices justified solely on grounds of discipline.33
Other principles also played important roles in preserving the hands-off doctrine. One was the traditional distinction drawn by courts between rights and privileges. In prison law, courts often labelled all features of prison existence as privileges, and consequently denied review3 4 A second policy was the notion that " [l] awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." 28 28 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407 (1974); Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1971 ), cert. denied sub noai. Sellars v. Beto, 409 U.S. 968 (1972 . The objection is not formulated in terms of a fear that the court will hold a regulation deemed essential to be void; rather, it is asserted that mere assumption of jurisdiction over the subject matter will of itself undermine prison authority and thwart the authorities' efforts to fulfill the task of custody. a5 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) . See also cases cited in note 34 supra.
As will be seen, these principles retained their vitality despite the demise of the traditional handsoff doctrine.
B. EROSION OF THE HANDS-OFF DOCTRINE IN LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court expanded the rights of criminal defendants, but generally ignored constitutional problems in correctional law. 36 However, the few relevant decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, together with the emergence of the entitlement doctrine in administrative law, paved the way for increasing intervention by the lower federal courts.
The hands-off doctrine suffered a major setback when, in In Jones, state prison officials issued regulations which permitted membership in the prisoners' union but prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates for membership, banned all union meetings and barred delivery of union publications mailed to the prison in bulk. A three-judge district court, though not disputing the officials' sincere belief in the union's potential threat to prison discipline and control, nevertheless invalidated the regulations because of the officials' failure to substantiate this fear.68 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the district court had neither appropriately deferred to the decisions of prison administrators nor sufficiently appreciated the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of confinement.'
Jones has been viewed as a significant departure from decisions such as Pell and Martinez. 70 However, in light of Wolfish, Jones does not appear to be a departure as much as a logical extension of the earlier rulings, with the complementary doctrines of withdrawal of privileges and judicial deference playing a more important role.
7
' First, Justice Rehnquist extinguished the doctrine of retained rights which had appeared in Martinez and Pell, albeit weakly, by making preeminent the supposition that "the fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived from the first amendment, which are implicit in incarceration."
72 He judged the restrictions to be reasonably related to the legitimate penological objectives, particularly because the first amendment associational rights virtually eliminated by the regulations were deemed inevitable victims in an institutional setting. on broad propositions found in Pell, he emphasized that first amendment infringements need only further a legitimate institutional interest, 7 5 and that the evaluation of whether a matter is detrimental to prison management lies so appropriately within the bounds of administrative discretion as to require the courts' deference to officials' judgment unless substantial evidence shows an exaggerated response.
76 Absent from the opinion are any references to Pelt's requirements for a limitation on first amendment rights only as to time, place, and manner 77 or its consideration of whether alternative means of communication were available. 78 Instead, Jones shifted the burden of proof away from the state by compelling the plaintiff to rebut the officials' general speculations as to the union's possible disruption to orderly administration: "[i]t is enough to say that they [the prison officials] have not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this view." 79 The sweeping language of Jones, the Court's refusal to scrutinize the asserted state interests, and its shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiff despite a first amendment infringement emphatically laid the groundwork for almost absolute judicial deference to many aspects of prison life.
Wolfish presented an opportunity to consider several unresolved issues. Contrary to the more typical suits involving long-established practices in antiquated facilities, the Metropolitan Correctional Center, an innovatively designed federal detention center,' 3 had been in operation for only four months when inmates brought this suit in district court.
8 ' In an exhaustive opinion, Judge Frankel held that numerous practices at the facility were unconstitutional.
2 The Supreme Court was to review the district court's injunctions prohibiting double-bunking in a cell admittedly built for one inmate, enforcement of the "publisher-only" rule, limitations on packages received by inmates, unannounced search of inmates' cells outside of their presence, and visual body cavity searches without probable cause.
Before addressing the plaintiffs particular complaints, Judge Frankel advanced several arguments favoring judicial intervention. As a general matter, he noted that the federalism-based reluctance of federal courts to interfere with state matters was inapposite, since the plaintiffs were federal prisoners. According to Frankel, nonintervention here would appear even more ludicrous, considering the federal courts' recent activism in state prisoner litigation.8 3 He next addressed the standard argument that federal statutes extended to prison officials the comprehensive control and almost complete discretion over federal prisoners.ss Employing the implication doctrine developed in J. . Case v.
Borake and later cases, he reasoned that the officials' statutory powers implied certain duties, the enforcement for which implicitly lay with the inmates, as the intended beneficiaries of those duties.
Turning to the underlying policies governing the constitutional issues, Judge Frankel stated three major principles, two of which were later rebuffed by the Supreme Court: that judgments of prison officials, "unless made arbitrarily or in conflict with particular rights given by Constitution or statute, are entitled to respect and probable final- The powers import duties,.., and these obligations (to take care, protect, classify, provide suitable quarters, and instruct) are not misconceived or distorted if we describe them as intended to "benefit" those locked up under federal authority. It is no long step from that to infer that some rights-at least against arbitrary, capricious, or unauthorized treatment-accrue to the prisoners for whose management the statutes were written (emphasis in original). The opinion also refers to the Administrative Procedure Act as support for permitting broader judicial responsibility with federal prisons. Id. Because the considerations permitting greater judicial intervention in federal prisoner cases are beyond the scope of this Article, the discussion of this issue has been omitted.
87ld. at 124.
[Vol. 71 ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law";s8 and that pretrial detainees, presumably innocent, are not subject to deprivation of any rights beyond those necessary to confinement, unless officials show a compelling necessity.8
Though rejectingJudge Frankel's statutory basis for judicial intervention, 9 the Second Circuit affirmed that the detainees had been denied due process of law.
91 It upheld the district court's requirement for the compelling necessity test in connection with restrictions on detainees, but cautioned temperance in light of the admonishment in Martinez concerning the courts' inability to deal with many problems in prison administration. Applying this analysis, the Court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the double-bunking at the facility-sharing toilet facilities and a sleeping place in a seventy-five square foot cell for sixty disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.
98 Id. at 538 (also quoting Mendoza-Martinez):
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on "whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]." 99 Id. at 540: It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees' presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility.., is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. 100Id. at 540-41 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827).
days-did not constitute a violation of the detainees' rights to due process. 1 Before addressing the security regulations affecting specifically guaranteed constitutional rights, Justice Rehnquist summarized four governing principles articulated in earlier decisions: convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections;'°2 incarceration brings about the withdrawal or limitation of rights and privileges; 1 0 3 maintaining security and preserving internal order and discipline may require limitation or withdrawal of retained constitutional rights as well;"1 4 and courts should give wide-ranging deference to prison officials' judgment, owing to their expertise as well as to the legislative delegation of operational authority to the executive branch.' 0 5 Having grounded its analysis in precedent, the Court proceeded to uphold each of the challenged practices as a rational response to valid institutional concerns for security and orderly administration. l 06 In his dissent, Justice Marshall attacked several points of the majority opinion which, not unexpectedly, were later to play a determinative role in lower federal court decisions. After first denouncing the minimal protection afforded detainees' liberty interests under the punishment test, and the Court's misapplication of its own test based on the Mendoza-Martinez guidelines, Justice Marshall criticized the Court's failure to enforce seriously the second step of its analysis-determining whether a particular imposition was rationally related to a nonpunitive purpose.
10 7 In any event, he believed that the Mendoza-Martinez guidelines were inappropriate in this situation, for "the Due Process Clause focuses on the nature of the deprivations, not on the persons inflicting them. ' Justice Marshall then advocated a balancing test for determining the reasonableness of all restrictions, regardless of whether the affected rights were implicitly or expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. 10 In his view, the first amendment claim regarding the "publisher-only" rule required some consideration as to less restrictive alternatives."' The limitation on packages, justified partly on grounds of creating administrative burdens, was seen as overly broad. Accepting, arguendo, the majority's evaluation that less restrictive regulations adopted in other institutions did not necessarily define the constitutional minimum, Justice Marshall still believed them to be effective in casting doubt upon the government's asserted justifications. 12 As to the most serious issue, body cavity searches, he charged that the Court ignored an examination of the particular facts in favor of absolute deference to administrative convenience, based on unsubstantiated claims of institutional security." The Wolfish majority's adoption of the MendozaMartinez punishment test for evaluating implied constitutional rights, together with the majority's wide-ranging deference to prison officials even with respect to explicit constitutional rights, accelerates the clearly marked trend towards a presumptive validity for prison regulations that began in Jones. Assuming the inappropriateness of the punishment test,"' it is in the Court's application of that test and of the general balancing test previously used for determining the constitutionality of prison regulations that Wolfish, buttressed by Jones, signals the overall approach to be taken for inmate complaints. As in Jones, the Court deftly avoided the nuances of the precedents from which it derived its guiding principles. Pell is particularly illustrative '9Id. at 568.
"OId. at 571: "As the substantiality of the intrusion on detainees' rights increases, so must the significance of the countervailing governmental objectives. [Vol. 71 of this process. In Pell, a first amendment case, Justice Stewart reiterated the familiar language on withdrawal of privileges, but he qualified this with the corollary principle that "a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system."" 5 He also stated that institutional security was the central penological goal. However, rather than simply accept at face value the purported concerns for institutional securil,'he seriously evaluated whether under the specific circumstances the existence of an alternative means of communication protected the plaintiff's first amendment rights before upholding the prison regulations.' 1 6 Nevertheless, Wolfish quoted Pell for the proposition that courts should defer to the officials'judgment absent substantial evidence of an exaggerated response on their part. 1 7 In context, Pell viewed this principle as merely one of several relevant factors for consideration.
IRA P. ROBBINS

118
Wolfish departed significantly even from Jones when the Court deferred so completely to administrative discretion that it ignored the facts of the record before it. For example, circumstances at the facility made it almost impossible to smuggle contraband after contact visits-visitors and their packages were searched by metal detector, by fluoroscope, and by hand before they entered the visiting room; contact visits were closely monitored and restricted to a glass-enclosed room; and prisoners wore one-piece jumpsuits at all times." 9 The
Court still upheld the validity of body cavity searches for contraband. In reaching this decision, the Court referred to the considerations of the fourth amendment balancing test-specifically, the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, thejustification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. 20 In fact, however, the Court considered only that "a By overlooking the particular facts and giving weight only to purported institutional interests, Wolfish has, in effect, shifted the burden of proof to the inmate in all challenges to prison practices and has imposed a presumptive validity on administrative judgments. The result is the "granting of virtually unreviewable discretion to correctional officials on questions involving the constitutional rights of inmates, ' ' is and a withdrawal of rights without balancing the actual reasonable needs of the institution with the intrusion on the inmates' asserted constitutional interests.
Jones and Wolfish have thus established a new hands-off doctrine: the Court will not deny jurisdiction, but the negative results based on the principle of wide-ranging deference to administrative discretion will now achieve the same result as the previously discredited jurisdictional bar.12
IV. IMPACT OF WOLFISH
Lower federal courts have generally shown a favorable reaction to Wolfish's deferential approach, but are not following blindly in the Supreme Court's steps. Characteristic of many decisions is a respect for the complex issues requiring more than a general pronouncement or total deference to even genuine institutional concerns. For this reason, Wolfish has not created an absolute bar to consideration of constitutional violations deemed worthy of vindication, although the courts differ greatly on which rights sufficiently warrant judicial intervention. The Court in Bell v. Wolfish failed to recognize that its constitutional duty to uphold the due process rights of citizens must take precedence over its reluctance to immerse the judiciary in the operation of detention centers. This failure suggests that the Court will hesitate to infer the presence of impermissible punishment unless faced, in its own words, with a case of "loading a detainee with chains and shackles and throwing him in a dungeon."
A. IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose .... Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on "whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.' 2 '
Although the "nonpunitive intent" standards would not be an appropriate defense against suits brought by state or federal prisoners on eighth amendment grounds, courts have relied heavily on Wolfish's deferential attitude in rejecting prisoners' claims that had not been specifically grounded in the Constitution. When compelled to address issues that involve implied constitutional rights, federal courts appear to be adopting the Wolfish emphasis on withdrawal of rights and deference to administrative discretion as the focal point of any analysis. Arguably, the right to a drug treatment program and a reasonably sized cell would promote rehabilitation and orderly management of an institution as effectively as other rights being given more serious consideration by the courts, yet many courts have chosen 137 Id. at 62-63 n.5: "We think that a good deal may depend on the type of institution involved, the nature of the inmates, and the nature of the confinement itself. Cf Bell v. Wolfish." [Vol. 71 to demarcate the bounds of permissible judicial intervention at this point. Although this line-drawing appears somewhat arbitrary, the courts' treatment of these matters reflects the pattern seen in all public institutional litigation: the ranking of certain social goals above others and a tendency to defer to administrative expertise when dealing with matters distantly related to immediate wrongs which caused judicial intervention initially. 1.
B. STRIP SEARCHES AND WOLFISH
Wolfish resolved a conflict among the circuits'39 when it upheld the right to conduct nonabusive visual body cavity inspections on less than probable cause.
4° Although the Sixth Circuit has treated this holding as a jurisdictional bar to complaints concerning strip searches, 14 1 other courts have shown some sensitivity in balancing the purported institutional interests against the serious invasion of the inmates' personal rights. In Hurley v. Ward,1 42 the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's injunction against visual body cavity searches of all state inmates without probable cause, but upheld the injunction as it pertained to the specific plaintiff, who had conclusively demonstrated abusive procedures directed at him. Though decided before Wolfish, this case recognized that the Supreme Court required particular deference to the exercise of informed judgment by state prison officials.
1 3 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Wolfish, the district court, on review, distinguished Hurley on its facts-the plaintiff was routinely subjected to strip searches though there had been no contacts with nonprison personnel and even when he had been manacled and constantly observed throughout the incident triggering the search-and paid obeisance to Wolfish only to the extent of modifying the order to permit routine visual body cavity searches after contact visits with outside personnel.' 44 Although generally responsive to the officials' needs to ensure security and maintain a stable administration, the Seventh Circuit in Bono v. Saxbe1 45 could not accept the reasonableness or rationality of strip searches before and after noncontact visits with family and friends. Wolfish's rationale was inapposite since it pertained to searches following contact visits. Rather than simply ban this procedure, however, the court remanded to give officials an opportunity to show a rational relationship to the legitimate goal of security.
6
Hurley and Bono portend a reluctance to disturb procedures designed to promote security unless absolutely necessary by insisting on a case-by-case review, and then providing officials with every opportunity to defend themselves. For instance, the Bono court chose to remand the case without questioning why the officials had chosen not even to discuss this major issue in their court papers. Ironically, this individualized approach will probably increase litigation, rather than reduce it.
C. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS NOT ADDRESSED BY WOLFISH
The courts' applications of Wolfish with respect to rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution differ markedly, depending on their willingness to accept the standardjustifications of security, orderly administration, and discipline asserted by prison officials. One court, dissatisfied with the blanket statement given by officials, described the dilemma experienced by every court: The Court's task is not an easy one. While deferring to the jail administration, the Court must still ensure that the administration's response to problems is "reasonable". The Court must be especially alert when the alleged justification for an administration decision is institutional security, because literally any restraint could be justified on the ground of increased security. A naked man in chains in a bare cell poses no risk. From that point on, every increase in freedom brings at least some decrease in security. Every decision in a prison environment involves the weighing of lesser or greater restraint against the increased or diminished chances of contraband or escape. While the Court may not substitute its judgment as to the proper balance of these factors, it must be satisfied that the balance struck by jail authorities is reasonable. The ambit of the administrators' discretion and judgment may be widebut it is not unbounded. The Court is not to usurp the role of the jailer. But it cannot abandon its role as a proper forum for adjudication of the rights of prisoners able or not lies here. Whether a particular restriction is reasonably related to the security or other legitimate objective of a jail facility depends upon the aim of the restriction, given the situation faced by administration of the particular institution, and the magnitude of the restriction as weighed against the desirability of the goal. It is almost impossible to decide that issue removed from the actual conditions of the particular jail house. A unique problem containing first amendment issues was posed to a Pennsylvania federal district court: does a long-term inmate who is a child molester and who has been segregated in the maximum-security housing unit for his own safety hold the same rights as regular inmates? As to the first amendment claims, the court answered, not entirely.iss It found that the plaintiff's access to religious services and other activities outside of the unit would require two guards and result in a strain on the facility's manpower. The court noted, however, that the defendants asserted no security justification for limiting the frequency of the plaintiff's religious exercise or access to reading material. Therefore, the prison was required to arrange for visits by the chaplain and delivery of legal and educational material to the plaintiff's cell. na Of particular interest is the two-sided argument advanced by the officials in defending the claims in this case. First, they contended that the plaintiff's fears were subjective, so that he waived his Mich. 1979) (federal law has delegated the responsibility of deciding appropriate reading material to Bureau of Prisons; courts cannot interfere).
'5 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (restriction must promote a substantial interest unrelated to suppression of expression; and the regulation must be no greater than is necessary to protect that interest).
's481 F. Supp. 732. Cf Chapman v Jago, 615 F.2d 1359 (6th. Cir. 1980 ) (summary denial of right to attend services for inmate in segregation because of security problems).
" 481 F. Supp. at 739 n.13. '59Id. at 1300-01.
[Vol. 71 rights as a regular inmate when he chose segregation. The court rebutted this argument with examples of incidents in which convicted child molesters, typically despised by the rest of the prison population, had been attacked. Basing much of its reasoning on the entitlement doctrine, the court stated:
Prison authorities may not condition the rights, privileges or opportunities of a prisoner who is objectively in danger of violent assault upon his renunciation of his Eighth Amendment right to be protected reasonably from violence directed at him by other inmates, except to the extent the Wolfishgrounded security considerations allow. 16°A lternatively, the officials expressed fear of disruptions if the plaintiff were permitted more privileges than the other inmates in the unit. 161 Not only did the court believe anticipation of prisoner resentment to be an exaggerated response to security interests, but it also found that the granting of privileges to selected inmates in the housing unit was commonplace and without incident. The courts appear to have remained receptive to claims of cruel and unusual punishment, whether the claims are challenges to individual practices or are complaints based on the totality of the circumstances. Whether Wolfish's recognition of the need for judicial supervision over eighth amendment claims'6 has induced this receptivity is difficult to ascertain; it is clear, though, that the deferential spirit of Wolfish has tempered many of the recent decisions in this area. Texas district court which had imposed a limitation on the prison population and ordered a weekly report on improvements of conditions was chided by the Fifth Circuit for premature intervention and involvement with minutiae. The court of appeals remanded for reconsideration in light of Wolfish.
Litigation over use of mechanical restraints and tear gas highlights the courts' struggle, in the aftermath of Wolfish, to accommodate the legitimate concerns of safety and security while preventing cruel and unusual punishment. A particularly good example is Spain v. Procunier, 168 which held that (1) the use of tear gas was appropriate if (a) used in nondangerous quantities, (b) no more convenient or safe control method was available, and (c) feasible steps were taken to protect those inmates who were not the object of the tear gas; (2) as to the specific plaintiffs, the prison had to cease using neck chains while the plaintiffs were in the prison's confines and possibly even out of prison, but the use of other mechanical restraints, e.g., leg manacles or waist chains, while outside of the prison, was permissible; and (3) denial of fresh air and regular outdoor exercise for the specific plaintiffs constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In Spain, the state argued that judicial interference was inappropriate in light of the dangerous nature of the plaintiffs. Though sympathetic to the problems associated with keeping dangerous men in safe The question ... as framed by Justice Rehnquist for the [Wolfish] majority, was whether conditions at 'the [Metropolitan Correctional Center] "amount[ed] to punishment of the detainee" in violation of Fifth Amendment due process. [441 U.S. at 535.] For a convicted inmate, on the other hand, confinement in a penal institution is punishment, and it is the execution of that confinement which is subject to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 153 n.19 (emphasis in original). '67Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980 ). The areas addressed by the district court concerned exercise programs, education and rehabilitation, medical treatment, food service, personnel, and ventilation and lighting. Cf Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980), which remanded for a determination of whether poor lighting in cells of the "Control Unit" was truly justified by the defendants' claim that the inmates would use extra light bulbs as weapons.
'68 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) . Cf Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (handcuffing of inmates in the "Control Unit" whenever outside of cell is permissible); Roudette v. Jones, 101 Misc. 2d 136, 420 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. 1979 ) (prison regulations concerning use of physical restraints for security held constitutional, but constant use of restraints whenever the plaintiffs were out of cells was abuse of regulations). custody under humane conditions, the court reminded the state of the federal court's ultimate duty to eliminate cruel and unusual punishment, citing Wolfish as support. 1 6 9 Hesitant to encroach on administrative discretion where the officials' fear of violence was genuine, the Ninth Circuit granted relief against certain practices only as they applied to the plaintiffs, except for its general prohibition against using lethal amounts of tear gas. Even then, the court would not have held in favor of the plaintiffs but for the fact that they had already been subjected to neck chains and lack of exercise for such a lengthy period of time (fourand-one-half years).7'
In Stewart v. Rhodes, 171 prison officials of a state facility used mechanical restraints to tie disruptive inmates to their beds. Often the inmates remained tied down in the same straddled position for several days, unclothed, without sheets and lying in their own waste. Defendants called this practice a "control measure" for inmates who had caused disturbances, assaulted guards, flooded cells, attempted escapes or suicide, and set fires.noted Wolfish's policy of withdrawal of rights, the court remarked: "As a matter of general policy, state prison inmates are accorded private visitation rights governed by applicable rules and regulations subject to restriction only as may be necessary in individual instances to maintain institutional security and safety and to prevent introduction of unauthorized substances.' a 8 V. CONCLUSION The number of pro-institution cases decided in the past year-and-a-half and the very few unqualifiedly pro-inmate decisions occurring during the same period suggest that the cry of Wolfish has been heard and welcomed in the federal courts.
180Id. at 26 n.7 (emphasis in original).
Yet the reluctance to intrude on prison management and acquiescence in the prisons' withdrawal of important interests were already deep-seated in prisoner cases prior to Wolfish. 1 8 1 One problem in determining Wolfish's impact at this time is that, with the exception of some eighth amendment claims, few of the complaints are clearly substantial constitutional violations. Doubtless Wolfish has weighted the already precarious constitutional balancing test in favor of the institutional interests, but the decisions do not yet indicate a willingness to ignore the facts before the courts. In short, the courts have not yet bestowed upon the prisons' asserted justifications the presumptive validity that Wolfish seemed to invite.
